The characteristics of an individual, the local labor market, and the firm where an individual is employed each may be associated with racial and ethnic disparities in employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). This study estimates two models to determine the relative effects of each of these three sets of characteristics on the likelihood a worker has a job with ESI. One model has two outcomes: the job comes with ESI or not. The other model has five possible outcomes: the individual is not offered ESI and is uninsured; the individual is not offered ESI and is insured; the individual is offered ESI but turns it down and is uninsured; the individual is offered ESI but turns it down and is insured; and the individual is offered ESI and accepts. Findings indicate that individual characteristics and firm characteristics are more likely to have significant and substantial effects on the probability that a person has ESI, while the effects of market characteristics appear to be conveyed through firm characteristics. Being African American or Hispanic is not significantly associated with having ESI in the twooutcomes model, but in the five-outcomes model each is associated significantly with being uninsured, either because the person has not been offered ESI or has declined offered coverage. Clearly, examining more nuanced outcomes is more informative about the role of race and ethnicity in why working people are uninsured.
The characteristics of an individual, the local labor market, and the firm where an individual is employed each may be associated with racial and ethnic disparities in employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). This study estimates two models to determine the relative effects of each of these three sets of characteristics on the likelihood a worker has a job with ESI. One model has two outcomes: the job comes with ESI or not. The other model has five possible outcomes: the individual is not offered ESI and is uninsured; the individual is not offered ESI and is insured; the individual is offered ESI but turns it down and is uninsured; the individual is offered ESI but turns it down and is insured; and the individual is offered ESI and accepts. Findings indicate that individual characteristics and firm characteristics are more likely to have significant and substantial effects on the probability that a person has ESI, while the effects of market characteristics appear to be conveyed through firm characteristics. Being African American or Hispanic is not significantly associated with having ESI in the twooutcomes model, but in the five-outcomes model each is associated significantly with being uninsured, either because the person has not been offered ESI or has declined offered coverage. Clearly, examining more nuanced outcomes is more informative about the role of race and ethnicity in why working people are uninsured.
Health insurance is not part of the employment compensation package for many American workers. A substantial number have health insurance through a spouse or may buy their own individual coverage-but more than 27 million working adults are without health insurance of any type (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Hill Lee 2006) . They account for 18.7% of the labor force and 72% of all uninsured adults. Policymakers looking to help working Americans gain health insurance have long noted that disproportionate shares of these uninsured workers are African Americans, Hispanics, and immigrants. A simple conclusion might be that discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities is behind these numbers. But uninsured workers also are more likely to be less educated, employed in small firms, and concentrated among several occupations and industries, especially various service industries (Gabel, Ginsburg, and Hunt 1997; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Hoffman and Pohl 2002; Schur and Feldman 2001) . These characteristics of the uninsured raise the question of why racial/ethnic minorities are more likely to be uninsured. Is it due to discrimination? Or could it be that they are less educated or live in areas where the occupations or jobs open to them do not typically have health insurance as part of compensation?
Many of the observed, simple relationships between employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) and worker or firm characteristics are highly correlated, so it is often difficult to say whether the worker's or the firm's characteristics are most important in explaining why a worker is uninsured. Moreover, it is likely that local labor market conditions interact with worker and firm characteristics in ways that affect the chances of a worker having ESI. It is known, for example, that in areas where unskilled labor is plentiful and few employment opportunities exist, employers often do not provide health insurance (Employer Health Benefits 2004) . Yet in other areas where the supply and demand for unskilled labor is more evenly matched, health insurance is offered more often to unskilled workers.
To develop policies that will reduce the disparities in ESI coverage, policymakers need to understand how the characteristics of an individual, of the local labor market, and of the firm where a person works affect the probability that a person will have a job with ESI. Surprisingly, there is little information about the relative importance of each of these sets of factors. The complex relationships among workers, firms, and local labor markets suggest that more complete models are needed to explain racial and ethnic disparities in ESI offers and coverage.
In this paper, we sketch a conceptual framework for considering all three sets of factors simultaneously, and then estimate the relative importance of individual, employer, and neighborhood/labor market effects on the likelihood of who will have ESI. The relative importance of these three sources of influence on which people have ESI has potential implications for public policies to address racial and ethnic differences in ESI coverage. For example, if the most important characteristics of the labor market (perhaps a high percentage of adults with low educational attainment) were unrelated to race/ ethnicity, then policies aimed at increasing the skills and educational level of everyone in the labor market area would be needed to attract employers more likely to offer ESI. Such a finding also would have implications for how long it might take to reduce the number of people without health insurance if we rely on public policies directed primarily at the underlying causes of differences in employment opportunities.
Background: Related Research and the Inherent Endogeneity Problem Two different strands of research are relevant for our study. One considers how the local job and housing markets where people live affect various outcomes. A large body of research supports an association between segregation in the housing market and racial differences in socioeconomic status, which in turn is associated with racial/ethnic differences in health and health care (Williams and Collins 2001) . As a result, sociologists and economists have developed hypotheses about how attributes of neighborhoods or markets and individual characteristics affect health outcomes (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1997; Diez Roux et al. 2001; Haas et al. 2004; Hackbarth, Silvestri, and Cosper 1995; Kawachi 1999; LaVeist 1993; LaVeist and Wallace 2000; Yen and Kaplan 1999; Wen and Christakis 2005) . Some of these papers have done a better job than others accounting for possible reverse causality where poorer health outcomes may lead to increased segregation, a topic we return to shortly.
A second body of research has focused on the link between health insurance and a per-son's place of work. This research has tried to explain why being employed is not a sufficient condition for having health insurance. In analyzing differences between workers with and without health insurance, the number of employees at a person's place of work (size of firm) is a significant predictor of whether the firm offers ESI (Blumberg and Nichols 2001; Employer Health Benefits 2004; Nichols et al. 1997 ). Very few of these studies, however, observe the premiums that workers actually pay or may face. As a result, the effect of the firm size is not independent of the effect of the premium choice facing an individual, since premiums are inversely related to firm size. The effect of the (unobserved) premium is being absorbed into the estimated effect of the size of the firm.
Since most people with private health insurance have it through an employer (either their own or that of another family member), more attention has been paid within the last decade to decomposing the decision process that leads to ESI coverage. The decomposition assumes that having ESI is actually a two-part decision process. The first part is an employer's decision whether to offer ESI; then, if the employer offers coverage, the second part is the employee's decision to accept coverage. The analysis of the employee decision process to take up coverage is conditional on the employee being offered ESI (Blumberg and Nichols 2001; Cantor, Long, and Marquis 1995; Cooper and Schone 1997; Cunningham 1999b; Feldman et al. 1997; Gabel, Ginsburg, and Hunt 1997; Gruber 2001; Gruber and Lettau 2000; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Marquis and Long 1999; McLaughlin 1994 McLaughlin , 1999 Vistnes 2000a, 2000b; Schur and Feldman 2001; Shore-Sheppard, Buchmueller, and Jensen 2000; Swartz, Marcotte, and McBride 1993; Thorpe and Florence 1999) . This two-part process ignores all the prior steps in a person's decision process that involve sorting to occupations or jobs that do or do not typically come with ESI. For example, the decision to be self-employed is assumed to occur exogenously to the decision to accept an offer of ESI; self-employed people are not included in the data for the empirical estimates of factors that affect the take-up decision precisely because including them would introduce bias into estimates of the take-up decision.
Both strands of research-on the effects of neighborhoods/job market and on the factors that explain who has ESI-suffer from relying on cross-sectional data rather than longitudinal data. Cross-sectional data reflect neighborhood or job market characteristics at a point in time, but do not capture the flows of people and jobs over time that result in the observed cross-sectional distribution of characteristics. For example, if poor job prospects cause highly skilled racial/ethnic minority individuals to leave a neighborhood, then it cannot be assumed that segregated neighborhoods lead to poor job prospects. Crosssectional data do not permit us to sort out the sequence of events that cause a neighborhood/ job market to be more racially or ethnically segregated than another. Similarly, crosssectional data about employees with and without ESI do not capture the sequence of events that cause different types of workers to sort to jobs with or without health insurance. This means that although the decomposition approach is useful for understanding the conditions under which employers offer ESI, it cannot address the endogeneity of workers sorting themselves to jobs with and without health insurance.
Local labor market characteristics may affect workers' ability to sort to firms offering or not offering insurance if most firms in an area either offer ESI or do not offer ESI. For example, people living in very rural areas may have few job opportunities that offer ESI. A worker wanting ESI and living in such an area would have to move away to find a job with ESI. This may be particularly problematic for racial/ethnic minorities who have strong ties to a homogeneous local community with the same racial/ethnic characteristics; they may not have many employment options with health insurance unless they move away from their communities. A low prevalence of employers offering ESI in rural areas or in some job market areas with high concentrations of racial/ethnic minorities is often observed in cross-sectional data; however, as in the earlier example, this could be due to reverse causality. The people who want health insurance may have sorted to other labor markets in order to obtain ESI.
Ideally, we need longitudinal data and randomized assignments to neighborhoods/ job markets to determine the effects of neighborhoods on workers' decisions to find jobs with ESI. Since this is not possible, the endogeneity issue could be addressed with an instrumental variable, the approach taken by others who have analyzed neighborhood or peer-group effects (Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1997; Evans, Oates and Schwab 1992; Duncan, Connell, and Klebanov 1997) . In our case, we need an instrument that is highly correlated with a person's job market/area of residence but not with whether a person wants a job with ESI, and another instrument that is highly correlated with the type of firm a person chooses to work at but not with whether the person wants a job with ESI. Finding either instrument seems difficult-if not impossible-and there are strong reasons for believing that a poor instrument would be worse than not using any (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997) .
Our approach to the potential endogeneity problem recognizes that there may be selection bias in the effect of the job market on whether one has a job with ESI. Although we cannot address this problem directly, we try to mitigate its effects by including several variables that describe the job market and the individual's potential need for health care, as well as interaction effects between the job market and the individual's characteristics, and interaction effects between the job market and the firm's characteristics. 1 In sum, when trying to develop effective policies and programs to help people gain ESI, the two strands of research point to the need for jointly considering the effects of a person's own characteristics, the characteristics of the firm where that person works, and the characteristics of the local labor market where a person lives. This is especially true if we suspect that race or ethnicity interacts with employment options in the local labor market.
Conceptual Framework
Our approach to modeling whether a worker has a job that includes ESI considers both demand and supply factors in a reduced-form model. This enables us to determine empirically the relative importance of individual, job market, and firm characteristics on the likelihood a person finds a job offering ESI. We take this reduced-form approach because of the empirical difficulty of estimating the corresponding two-part structural model and because there are serious issues of interpretation with that model. As noted earlier, a structural model has two parts: the supply of and demand for jobs that offer ESI, and the demand for ESI, conditional on having a job that offers it. 2 Our approach combines these models into a single, reduced-form framework.
We start with a conceptual framework where three sets of factors-individual, job market, and firm-all affect the probability that a worker will find a job with ESI. Worker heterogeneity is assumed to cause workers to have different preferences for jobs that offer ESI. Personal characteristics may reflect an individual's needs and tastes for health care, as well as expectations regarding what is in a wage-compensation package. People who earn higher incomes, for example, may prefer jobs with ESI as part of the total compensation because they face higher marginal tax rates and the value of the ESI is not taxed as income.
We assume that a worker's total compensation equals the worker's marginal product and that there is a trade-off between wages and fringe benefits; this implies that if an employer offers health insurance, the wage portion of the total compensation package will be lower than it would be if ESI were not offered. 3 However, as noted previously, we also expect that some workers who may desire health insurance do not find jobs with ESI because there are transaction costs in finding out which firms offer ESI or in moving to areas where employers offer health insurance. This suggests that people who do not have a job with ESI may not have much opportunity to find a job with ESI. A number of occupations-at the high-skill as well as the low-skill end of the spectrum-now typically do not have ESI as part of the compensation package (Swartz 2006) .
We also assume that a person's marital status has an impact on the trade-off between wages and fringe benefits, although the direction of the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, having a spouse (especially one who is not working in the labor market) may increase a worker's desire to find a job with ESI, especially if there are children in the family. On the other hand, a married worker may have access to ESI from the spouse's employer, if the spouse also is working for pay, and in that case the worker may not search for a job with ESI. We expect that local market factors affect both a worker's search for a job with ESI, and a firm's need to offer ESI to compete for the workers it wants in its labor force. There is evidence that rates of ESI vary substantially by region and state, as well as industry (Brown, Wyn, and Teleki 2000; Coburn et al. 1998) . Counties with higher rates of ESI are characterized by stronger economic conditions (e.g., lower rates of unemployment) (Brown, Wyn, and Teleki 2000) . We also expect that the observed geographic differences in ESI reflect different norms in individuals' expectations about being able to obtain ESI and their need for ESI. Such norms may be different particularly for Hispanics and African Americans. We further expect that there may be differences within racial/ethnic groups about expectations for obtaining jobs with ESI. Among working Hispanic males, for example, there are substantial regional differences in private health insurance coverage (Fronstin, Goldberg, and Robins 1997; Monheit and Vistnes 2000b) . Similarly, with respect to immigrants, who tend to settle in areas with others from their country of origin (areas that are sometimes referred to as ''ethnic enclaves''), there is evidence that earnings are affected both by how concentrated the ethnic population is and the quality of the area (Borjas 1995; Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003) . Thus, we expect that the likelihood that someone obtains a job with ESI is affected by his or her community's racial/ethnic concentration. Workers' views about their need for ESI also may be affected by the availability of ''safetynet'' resources in the area (Cunningham 1999a; Herring 2005) .
Lastly, a worker's search for a job with ESI also is affected by employer characteristics that affect a firm's decision to offer ESI. We expect that the size and industry of the firm are the most important employer characteristics in this regard (Nichols et al. 1997; Swartz 1989 Swartz , 1992 . As noted earlier, small firms are less likely to offer ESI and certain industries have high rates of uninsured workers (Gabel, Ginsburg, and Hunt 1997; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Hoffman and Pohl 2002; Schur and Feldman 2001) .
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Empirical Models
In this study, we are interested in two questions: Is discrimination or something else (worker characteristics, market characteristics, or firm characteristics) responsible for the racial/ethnic disparities observed in ESI coverage? What is the relative importance of each set of characteristics in explaining differences in ESI coverage? We also are interested in determining whether there are any racial/ethnic differences in people who decline offered coverage, compared to people who do not decline coverage.
To answer these questions, it is useful to start by examining the simple differences in being offered ESI by race/ethnicity. Table 1 , based on data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (explained later), shows the percentages of white, African-American, and Hispanic workers who are offered ESI, and then the percentages of each group with different characteristics. Almost two-thirds of whites and African Americans are offered ESI, suggesting that African Americans and whites do not differ in the simple probability of having jobs that offer ESI. However, Hispanics are significantly less likely to have a job that comes with ESI-only half of our sample of Hispanics have jobs where ESI was offered. When we estimate a simple model of whether or not a person has a job that offers ESI, with race/ethnicity, age and age-squared, gender, and an intercept term as explanatory variables (results not shown), we find that these simple differences by race/ethnicity remain for Hispanics. When the time a person has been in the United States (for those who are not native born) and whether or not a person has a chronic health condition are added to the model, being African American becomes statistically significant. Being Hispanic remains significant rather than declining in significance when accounting for time in the United States.
Given these significant differences by race/ ethnicity, we investigate whether the racial/ ethnic differences in this relatively simple model persist when other characteristics are added as explanatory variables. Based on our conceptual framework, we estimate two models to determine the relative effects of individual, market, and employer characteristics that may explain racial/ethnic disparities in ESI coverage. The first is a reduced-form binary logit model of whether the worker has a job that offers ESI.
The second is a more nuanced model of job and insurance choices that reflects the full range of possible outcomes when a person takes a job: 1) ESI is offered and accepted; 2) ESI is offered and declined but the person is insured elsewhere; 3) ESI is offered and declined and the person is uninsured (perhaps because the worker's out-of-pocket premium cost is high); 4) ESI is not offered but the person is insured elsewhere; or 5) ESI is not offered and the person is uninsured. We estimate this model because we want to explore whether race and ethnicity are significantly associated with people turning down ESI. This ''five-outcomes'' model was estimated as an unordered (n-chotomous) multinomial logit model. 4 Characteristics of workers, job markets, and firms are independent variables in both models. Also in both models, we correct for the clustering of people by county in our sample. 5 (Contrary to our expectations, interactions between individual and marketlevel characteristics were not statistically significant, and therefore are not included in the final models reported.)
We compare the goodness-of-fit measures of each of the models when they have different combinations of the sets of characteristics (Render et al. 2003) to assess the relative impact of each of the three sets of characteristics (individual, market, and firm) on explaining the variance in who has a job that offers ESI. For each model, we estimated versions including each set of characteristics individually; combinations of two of the three sets; and the full model with all three sets of characteristics. The Pearson Chi-square, normalized for the degrees of freedom in each model, is used as the goodness-of-fit measure for the two-outcomes model and the pseudo-R-square is used as the goodness-of-fit measure for the five-outcomes model.
Data
Our empirical analyses are based on data from the 1996-2000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component (MEPS-HC), a nationally representative sample of the U.S. civilian, noninstitutionalized population (Cohen et al. 1996) . The MEPS-HC contains extensive data on the demographic characteristics, health insurance coverage, health status, and chronic conditions of individuals and their family members, and data on their employers. The MEPS over-sampled African-American and Hispanic households.
We merged 2000 census data about the characteristics of each individual's county of residence with the MEPS data. 6 We used a person's county of residence as a proxy for the labor market in which that person might look for a job, assuming that the characteristics of a person's county of residence are highly correlated with the characteristics of the person's relevant labor market area. In some parts of the United States, a person's county of residence is not synonymous with the labor market area in which he or she might search for a job. Such places include the smaller counties, such as those in the New England states, where job market areas frequently are larger than one county, and multicounty metropolitan areas that cross state boundaries such as Washington, D.C., or Kansas City. We try to control for discrepancies between counties and labor market areas by including information about whether a county is considered urban versus rural, and in which region of the United States the county is located. 7
Sample
The analysis sample includes adults 18-to-64 years old who were employed at least part time for some portion of the year and described their race/ethnicity as white, African American or Hispanic. We excluded adults between the ages of 18 and 25 who were full-time students, individuals insured by circumstances outside the reporting household unit, and individuals whose occupation was described as ''active military.''
We also excluded individuals who were self-employed because of the added complexity of modeling the decision to be selfemployed as part of the process of looking for a job. People who are married, for example, may find it more feasible to be self-employed if they have health insurance through the spouse's job; alternatively, people who are not married may find it feasible to be self-employed and not insured because they do not have to worry about a spouse or other family members. We believe that the selfemployed are different in unobservable ways from people who work for firms and the unobservable variables could be causal factors in whether someone has ESI, so we chose to omit the self-employed. Excluding them from our sample did not cause a significant loss in the number of people since among all workers in the labor force, only about 7% are self-employed. 8 After excluding these groups of individuals, our sample consists of 26,813 adults for whom we have data on all of the individual and firm characteristics. This sample represents most working adults in the United States.
Independent Variables
Characteristics of each worker, the county where the worker resides, and the firm where the worker is employed comprise the independent variables in our analyses (see Table 1 ). Individual characteristics include: age, gender, education (coded as high school or less, some college, college graduate or beyond), marital status (married, other), race/ethnicity (white, African American, Hispanic), time of residence in the United States (native born, more than 10 years, six to 10 years, five years or less), whether there is another wage earner in the household, whether there are children in the household, household income (continuous), an indicator of chronic illness in a household member, the self-rated health status of the individual (poor or fair versus good, very good, or excellent), whether the person has full-year versus part-year employment and full-time versus part-time employment, whether the individual is a salaried employee, union member, and occupation. Several other characteristics of workers that were included in preliminary models were removed because they were not significant. We also estimated models with interactions between time in the United States and being Hispanic to determine whether foreign-born Hispanics were particularly less likely to have jobs that offered ESI, but the interaction effects were not statistically significant.
County characteristics include separate dummy variables to indicate whether a county is segregated for African Americans or segregated for Hispanics. These indicators are based on the Index of Dissimilarity, which is a measure of residential segregation that measures the fraction of one racial/ethnic group that would need to move from its census tract to another census tract in the county in order to attain perfect integration. The Index of Dissimilarity ranges from 0 (integrated) to 1 (segregated). Typically, counties are considered highly segregated if the index of dissimilarity is greater than or equal to .6 (Massey and Denton 1989) . Because Hispanics are less segregated in the United States than African Americans, we used an index greater than .5 as an indicator that a county is highly segregated for Hispanics (Massey and Denton 1988) . Other county characteristics include the percentages of residents who are foreign-born, unemployed, have a household income below the federal poverty level, and adults who have not graduated from high school. 9 We also control for whether the county of residence is in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), and which of four regions of the country the county is in (West, Midwest, South, or Northeast) . Employer characteristics include firm size (1 to 9, 10 to 39, 40 to 99, 100 to 249, 250 to 499, and 500 or more employees), and the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for industry.
The data have several limitations. Because of the cross-sectional nature of these data, we cannot assume causality for any observed associations. For example, we do not have data about how long someone has lived in a market area or whether that person moved to seek employment. We could not measure some market characteristics that may influence an individual's decision about ESI, such as the ''safety-net'' resources that may be available (Herring 2005; Marquis, Rogowski, and Escarce 2004) . We did explore the effect of whether a county was a designated primary care shortage area, but it was not statistically significant and therefore not included in the final models. County of residence also may not capture the relevant job market. Peer influences, for example, may operate in smaller areas not available in these data. However, counties have been used as the geographic unit in other research examining market-level influences (Baker 1997 (Baker , 1999 . We would have preferred to identify specific MSAs where people lived because some MSAs are more homogeneous than others in terms of the country of origin of immigrants (and Hispanics) (Kritz and Gurak 2004) . We also would have liked to use identifiers for specific states because in the early 1990s most newly arrived immigrants lived in seven states (Farley 1997) . However, the rules under which researchers are permitted access to county of residence data on the MEPS precludes identifying specific MSAs or states other than by region.
Characteristics of the Sample
There is substantial variation in the independent variables among the three racial and ethnic groups in our sample (see Table 1 ). As we noted earlier, Hispanic workers were much less likely to be in jobs that offered ESI-only half of them were offered coverage compared to 65% of whites and African Americans. In data not shown in Table 1 , among the 36% of all workers who were not offered ESI, half were uninsured and half were insured through another source. Of those who were offered ESI, 84.2% accepted the offered ESI, 10.8% declined the ESI but obtained insurance from another source, and 5% declined the ESI and were uninsured. This pattern is consistent with previous research on take-up rates among people offered ESI (Cunningham 1999b; Cooper and Schone 1997) .
As can be seen in Table 1 , the distributions of each of the worker, market, and firm characteristics differ substantially for the white, African-American, and Hispanic workers. Among the significant differences: white workers in the sample were older than the African-American workers, who in turn were older than the Hispanic workers. More than half of the African-American workers were women, while just 43% of the Hispanic workers were women. Although a majority of individuals in the sample were native-born, only 53% of the Hispanic workers were born in the United States. Even though the vast majority of workers in the sample lived in metropolitan areas, there are significant differences among the three groups in the degree to which they lived in counties that can be considered segregated by the Index of Dissimilarity. Among the African-American workers, almost half lived in counties that were segregated for African Americans, and two out of five lived in counties that were segregated for Hispanics. Among the Hispanic workers, 44% lived in counties that were segregated for Hispanics, and 38% lived in counties that were segregated for African Americans. More than a fourth of the whites lived in the Midwest, but only 8% of the Hispanics in our sample lived there. Even though the vast majority of the workers in the sample were not salaried employees, almost 30% of the white workers were salaried while only 18% of the Hispanics were. The differences in the distributions of occupational categories for the three groups are consistent with the differences in proportions of those who are salaried. The firms that the three groups worked for varied in size (with a much higher proportion of African Americans working in the largest firms) and industry.
Results
Since the MEPS sample was drawn using a multistage cluster sampling design with disproportionate stratification, person weights that account for this were used in estimating both models. Our estimation procedures also accounted for the clustering of individuals within counties.
Factors Associated with Having a Job that Offers Employer-Sponsored Insurance
Given our interest in the impact of race and ethnicity on holding a job that offers ESI, the estimated coefficients for the model with only individuals' characteristics are consistent with the simple comparisons in Table 1 . As can be seen in the left column of Table 2, when the model includes only individuals' characteristics, compared to whites, African Americans are more likely to have jobs that offer ESI and Hispanics are less likely. Other significant personal characteristics associated with an increased probability of having a job that offers ESI are: older age, greater educational attainment, being native born, not having children in the household, several occupations, and being a salaried employee, union member, and working full time and full year.
However, when market characteristics are included in the model (middle column of Table 2 ), being Hispanic is no longer a significant factor, while the significance of most of the other individual characteristics does not change. Individuals who live in the Midwest and a county that is segregated for Hispanics are more likely to be offered ESI, while people who live in a county with more foreign-born residents are less likely to be offered ESI.
Adding firm characteristics to the model (right column of Table 2) eliminates the statistically significant association between being African American or Hispanic and having a job that offers ESI, and the only county characteristic that remains significant is the percentage who are foreign-born. The firm characteristics themselves are strongly associated with the likelihood that a person has a job with ESI. Employees in the smallest firms are the least likely to be offered health coverage. Employment in agriculture, construction, repair services, personal services, or entertainment services significantly reduces a person's likelihood of being offered coverage relative to working in a professional services firm. By contrast, employment in a firm involved in mining, manufacturing, or public administration significantly raises the likelihood that a person is offered ESI.
Using the Pearson Chi-square as a measure of the goodness-of-fit and comparing results among the variations of the model-that is, with only one set of characteristics (individual, market, and firm), then with combinations of two sets, and finally with the full model-indicate that the individual characteristics and the firm characteristics are responsible for most of the explained variance in which people have ESI (Table 3) . By contrast, the market characteristics contribute very little to the explained variance. These comparisons, and the result that the foreignborn percentage of the county population remains the only significant county characteristic when the firm characteristics are included in the model, imply that there is shared variance between the market and firm characteristics.
To illustrate the relative effects of the estimated coefficients of the full model, Table 4 provides the predicted probabilities of 12 prototypical people who vary in terms of the statistically significant characteristics. The three principal people have the mean or primary characteristics of the white, African-American, and Hispanic workers in our sample. Statistically significant characteristics then are altered to show how some of the individual characteristics, county characteristics, and firm characteristics affect the pre-dicted probabilities of having a job with ESI. The last two people have several characteristics that vary simultaneously to illustrate their joint effects on the probability of having a job with ESI. Changes in individual and firm characteristics have substantial effects, while a change in the percentage of the county population that is foreign-born alters the predicted probability only slightly. ) Given our primary interest in understanding the relative effects of race and ethnicity, the model with five outcomes suggests different and more complex results than the two-outcomes model, which did not find a significant association between race/ ethnicity and having a job that offers ESI. Relative to whites, both African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be uninsured in the five-outcomes model-either because they have not been offered ESI or because they have declined offered coverage.
Factors Associated with the Five-Outcomes Model
The results from the five-outcomes model for time in the United States and age are consistent with the two-outcomes model: immigrant workers are more likely not to be offered ESI and to be uninsured than nativeborn workers, and older workers are more likely to have a job that offers ESI and to accept such coverage. The effects of gender on having a job with ESI and insurance status are more nuanced in the five-outcomes model than in the two-outcomes model. The results indicate that gender is not significant in the two dominant outcomes of ''no offer and uninsured'' and ''offered and accepted;'' however, when we examine the other three outcomes, holding all else equal, men are significantly less likely to have coverage when a job does not have ESI and when they decline offered coverage. In marked contrast to the two-outcomes model, household income is significant in distinguishing between the five possible outcomes-higher-income people are more likely to be offered and to accept ESI or to have insurance coverage even if they have jobs where ESI is not offered or if they decline offered coverage.
Other significant individual characteristics can be seen in Table 5 and are consistent with what we found in the two-outcomes model.
Only a few market characteristics are significantly associated with the five different outcomes. As in the two-outcomes model, workers who live in counties with more foreign-born residents are more likely to have jobs that do not offer ESI than workers who live in counties with fewer immigrants. Workers who live in counties with higher proportions of people in poverty are more likely to be in the outcome of ''uninsured because they were not offered ESI,'' although the poverty rate in the county is not significantly associated with any of the other four outcomes. Other market characteristics not significant in differentiating between the five outcomes are whether a county is segregated for African Americans or for Hispanics, the county unemployment rate, and the percentage of adult residents in the county who did not graduate from high school.
As with the two-outcomes model, firm size and industry are strongly associated with the five different insurance outcomes. As firm size increases, workers are more likely to be offered insurance. However, the firm-size effect is not significant above 100 employees other than for workers who have jobs without ESI offers but still are insured. The industry of the firm where an individual works also is associated with whether an individual is offered ESI and then accepts or declines it. As we saw in the simple two-outcomes model, workers in certain industries are more likely to be offered ESI. Table 6 shows the goodness-of-fit measures (pseudo R-squares) for the five-outcomes model when each of the different variations of individual, market, and firm characteristics are included in the model. As in the twooutcomes model, the county characteristics contribute relatively little to the explained variance of the outcomes, reinforcing the conclusion that there appears to be shared variance between the county and firm characteristics.
To illustrate the effects of the different types of characteristics, Table 7 shows the estimated probabilities for the five outcomes for the 12 prototypical people in Table 4 . As in Table 4 , the first 10 people have the mean or primary characteristics of the white, African-American, and Hispanic workers in our sample. Statistically significant characteristics are altered to show how some of the individual characteristics, county characteristics, and firm characteristics affect the predicted probabilities for each of the five possible outcomes of having a job that does or does not have ESI and of whether the person is insured. Prototypical individuals 4 and 5 have several characteristics that differ simultaneously to illustrate how the probabilities can vary when common sets of characteristics are present.
To show the relative effect of being African American or Hispanic (rather than white) on .52 Also increase % foreign-born in county to 11.7% (from 8.8%)
.51 Also increase firm size from 1-9 to 100-249 employees .87
Person 2: African-American female b .50 Change occupation to clerical worker (from service worker)
.63 Also increase firm size from 10-39 to 250-499 employees .77
Person 3: Hispanic male c .43 Change to foreign-born and in U.S. for 5-10 years .34 Also change occupation to craftsperson and industry to construction .39
Person 4: African-American male d .87
Person 5: Hispanic male e .81
Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated model in Table 2 . a Person is: 41-year-old white male, native born, high school grad, married, no children in household, no other wage earner in household, family income is $40,000, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a sales worker; lives in MSA that is not in Midwest, county is not segregated, county foreign-born population 5 8.8%, county unemployment rate 5 3.4%, county poverty rate 5 11%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 18.3%; firm's number of employees is between one and nine, and firm is in manufacturing industry. b Person is: 38-year-old African-American female, native born, high school grad, not married, no children in household, no other wage earner in household, annual income of $20,000, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a service worker; lives in MSA that is not in the Midwest, county is segregated for African Americans, county foreign-born population 5 11.7%, county unemployment rate 5 4.1%, county poverty rate 5 14.4%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 21.5%; firm's number of employees is between 10 and 39, and firm is in the personal services/entertainment industry. c Person is: 36-year-old Hispanic male, high school graduate, native born, married, children in household, no other wage earner in household, family income of $16,500, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a service worker; lives in MSA that is not in Midwest, county is not segregated for Hispanics, county foreign-born population 5 20.8%, county unemployment rate 5 4.2%, county poverty rate 5 16%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 25.7%; firm's number of employees is between 10 and 39, and firm is in the personal services/entertainment industry. d Person is: 30-year-old African-American male, some college, native born, married, children in household, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, no other wage earner in the household, family income is $50,000, not a salaried employee, is a union member, works full time and full year, occupation is a craftsman; lives in a non-MSA that is not in the Midwest, county is not segregated for African Americans, county foreign-born population 5 11.7%, county unemployment rate 5 4.1%, county poverty rate 5 14.4%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 21.5%; firm has 10 to 39 employees, and firm is in transportation industry. e Person is: 36-year-old Hispanic male, same as 3 b except he earns $20,000 and works for a government agency with at least 500 employees. the five outcomes-especially those that result in being uninsured- Table 7 contains the estimated probabilities for individuals 2 and 3 if their race were white instead of African American or Hispanic. In both cases, the probability of not being offered ESI falls and the probability of being offered ESI and accepting it increases. In the case of the African-American woman (person 2), if she were white, the outcome with the highest predicted probability shifts from not being offered ESI and being uninsured to accepting offered ESI. Note, however, that the estimated probabilities for the other outcomes do not really change, showing that the significant coefficients for African American for the outcomes of ''not offered ESI but insured'' and ''offered ESI, declined and uninsured'' are swamped by other characteristics (most notably size of firm). In the case of the Hispanic man (person 3), if he were white, the probability of being offered ESI and accepting it increases, but not enough to dominate the outcome of ''not offered ESI and uninsured.'' As with the shift from African American to white, the estimated probabilities for the three non-dominant outcomes do not really change when the Hispanic man becomes white. Overall, the examples in Table 7 illustrate that the probabilities of each of the five outcomes are most affected by the person's individual characteristics and the characteristics of the firm.
Discussion of Results and Policy Implications
Within the context of racial/ethnic disparities among workers having jobs with ESI, these results support the hypothesis that firm characteristics reduce the simple associations between racial/ethnic characteristics and the simple two-outcomes situation of whether a worker does or does not have a job with ESI. In particular, when the characteristics of a worker's firm are taken into account, being either African American or Hispanic is not significantly associated with whether or not a person has a job with ESI. The results do not support the hypothesis that market characteristics, measured at the county level, have an independent and significant impact on a person obtaining a job with ESI.
Instead, the results suggest that there is shared variance between the market and firm characteristics: the market characteristics are related indirectly to firm characteristics, and it is the firm characteristics that are mediating the effects of the market characteristics. When estimating a more complex model of five possible outcomes of insurance status, we find that the two-outcomes model masks significant differences by race and ethnicity. Compared to whites, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to have jobs where ESI is not offered and more likely to be uninsured; African Americans are less likely to have insurance from another source if their jobs come without ESI. This contradicts the finding from the two-outcomes model that race/ethnicity is not significantly associated with having a job that offers ESI. The results from the five-outcomes model also show that when African Americans and Hispanics have jobs with ESI, they are more likely than whites to decline the offered insurance and to be uninsured. In other words, when we go behind the two-outcomes model to a more complex set of ESI and insurance status outcomes, African Americans and Hispanics are more likely than whites to have jobs without ESI, and to be uninsured; this is because they are less likely to have another type of insurance coverage to replace ESI if it either is not offered or is offered but declined. It should be noted, however, that the race/ ethnicity effects on declining offered coverage are not large; 10 when we estimated the probabilities of the different outcomes for prototypical people, the predicted probabilities for turning down offered ESI and being uninsured did not change significantly when race/ethnicity was changed (see Table 7 ). Overall, the magnitudes of the significant effects of race and ethnicity are relatively small, and appear to be swamped particularly by characteristics of the firm.
Relative to being a native-born American, foreign-born workers' duration of residence is significantly related only to having a job without an ESI offer and being uninsured. Of the market characteristics, only the percentage of the foreign-born population and the percentage with incomes below the poverty level are associated with insurance status -and they are associated only with having a job that does not offer ESI. The results do not support the hypothesis that residential segregation is associated with any of the five outcomes.
Reducing racial and ethnic disparities in ESI may be one of the most direct ways of reducing disparities in health insurance coverage. However, the finding from the more nuanced and informative five-outcomes model that African Americans and Hispanics are more likely to be uninsured because they work for firms that do not offer ESI or because they decline ESI when it is offered does not provide a causal mechanism for reducing disparities in ESI. Although this finding remains after controlling for firm size and industry and job market characteristics, it is not clear why the firms where African Americans and Hispanics work do not offer ESI. The result that the market characteristics appear to be mediated by the firms' characteristics suggests that firms less likely to offer ESI (that is, firms that are small or in certain industries) are in markets with characteristics such as higher rates of less educated adults that we would expect to be related to lower productivity.
Unfortunately, our approach cannot distinguish between apparent discrimination against African Americans or Hispanics in hiring and any cultural or social differences that might cause African Americans or Hispanics to value health insurance less than do whites. For example, in the five-outcomes model, the statistically significant negative coefficients for African Americans and Hispanics for the outcome of ''not offered ESI and uninsured'' could be consistent with at least two explanations: they are discriminated against in the labor market or they differ from whites in their preferences for cash wages or desire for ESI. Similarly, the fact that the race/ethnicity variables are significant for the outcome of ''offered ESI, declined and uninsured'' could be interpreted as implying either that African Americans and Hispanics do not value ESI or do not want (or are not able to afford) to pay the employee share of the premium. However, because a job that provides ESI as part of compensation differs from a job that does not offer ESI, we should not conclude from the small number of people who decline offered coverage that African Americans and Hispanics do not value ESI, particularly since we cannot distinguish between the explanations.
We also cannot differentiate between a situation where African Americans, for example, might prefer to live in counties with fewer job opportunities with ESI because of family ties to the counties (i.e., where preferences for these relationships outweigh a desire for health insurance) and one where discrimination in housing markets prevents them from moving to other counties with better job opportunities. Moreover, although being African American or Hispanic are statistically significant characteristics for predicting the probability that someone will not be offered ESI and will be uninsured, the relative impacts of the race/ethnicity categories are small. Any education beyond high school, being a salaried employee, or working in a larger firm or certain industries outweigh the association between race/ethnicity and a job without offered ESI.
Altogether, the results imply that public policies are needed to provide health insurance to low-income workers, who also are dispro- Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the estimated model in Table 5 . Some prototypical people's probabilities do not sum to 1.0 due to rounding errors. a Person is: 41-year-old white male, native born, high school grad, married, no children in household, no other wage earner in household, family income is $40,000, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a sales worker; lives in MSA that is not in Midwest, county is not segregated, county foreign-born population 5 8.8%, county unemployment rate 5 3.4%, county poverty rate 5 11%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 18.3%; firm's number of employees is between one and nine, and firm is in manufacturing industry. b Person is: 38-year-old African-American female, native born, high school grad, not married, no children in household, no other wage earner in household, annual income of $20,000, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a service worker; lives in MSA that is not in the Midwest, county is segregated for African Americans, county foreign-born population 5 11.7%, county unemployment rate 5 4.1%, county poverty rate 5 14.4%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 21.5%; firm's number of employees is between 10 and 39, and firm is in the personal services/entertainment industry. c Person is: 36-year-old Hispanic male, high school graduate, native born, married, children in household, no other wage earner in household, family income of $16,500, not a salaried employee, not a union member, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, works full time and full year, occupation is a service worker; lives in MSA that is not in Midwest, county is not segregated for Hispanics, county foreign-born population 5 20.8%, county unemployment rate 5 4.2%, county poverty rate 5 16%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 25.7%; firm's number of employees is between 10 and 39, and firm is in the personal services/entertainment industry. d Person is: 30-year-old African-American male, some college, native born, married, children in household, in excellent-good health, no chronic illness in household, no other wage earner in the household, family income is $50,000, not a salaried employee, is a union member, works full time and full year, occupation is a craftsman; lives in a non-MSA that is not in the Midwest, county is not segregated for African Americans, county foreign born population 5 11.7%, county unemployment rate 5 4.1%, county poverty rate 5 14.4%, county adult population not graduated from high school 5 21.5%; firm has 10 to 39 employees, and firm is in transportation industry. e Person is: 36-year-old Hispanic male, same as 3 b except he earns $20,000 and works for a government agency with at least 500 employees.
workers. Such policies will not directly address racial and ethnic disparities in insurance coverage, but they will assist the dispropor-tionate number of African Americans and Hispanics who have low incomes and jobs without ESI.
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1 Through this strategy, we have attempted to minimize the possible endogenous effects that surround obtaining a job with ESI. 2 From a worker's perspective, however, the decision is whether to find a job at a firm that offers ESI in the first place. Very few people who are offered ESI turn it down and remain uninsured (Cooper and Schone 1997; Cunningham 1999b) . Among the adults in our sample, 63.6% were offered coverage at their jobs, and 84% of these people accepted the offers. Just one in four of the people who turned down offered coverage remained uninsured-so only a little more than 4% of the people who are offered ESI turn it down and remain uninsured. Modeling the decision process as an accept/reject decision conditional on ESI being offered obscures the sorting behavior of workers. If we believe that workers who have a preference for health insurance try to sort themselves to firms that offer ESI, then what do we make of someone who does not accept the offered ESI? A person who does not accept ESI is not necessarily evidence of bad job sorting. What could appear to be bad job sorting might be the result of any of a variety of transaction costs, frictions or information problems in the labor market. For example, the cost of searching for a job that has the right mix of salary and fringe benefits can be very high. Someone might choose to accept a job that offers a high wage, and simply let slip the deadline for signing up for health insurance. Or as an anonymous reviewer suggested, someone may want the option of enrolling in a group health insurance policy in the future, and therefore will look for a job at a large employer that has an annual open enrollment period. (We thank the reviewer for reminding us of this possibility. In many states, however, this scenario can happen only when at least 70% of a firm's workers are enrolled in health insurance offered by the company.) 3 The corollary of this is that employees pay the full amount of the premium because they are paid lower wages than they would if they did not have ESI (Gruber and Lettau 2000; Krueger and Reinhardt 1994) . 4 Estimating the model with multinomial logit requires the assumption that the five alternative choices are independent so the relative odds to choices being selected is independent of the presence of any other alternative (the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption). Even though it may seem that the primary choice is between having a job that does or does not offer ESI, we see the nuanced five choices as being separate and independent. That is, as we explained in the conceptual framework section, people may search for a job that offers ESI because generally firms that offer ESI also pay higher wages; individuals may decide a priori that they will not accept offered coverage either because they already have insurance (perhaps through a spouse) or because they do not want to pay the premium share required of employees. Other people prefer a job or occupation that does not usually have ESI as part of the compensation package because they already have insurance through a spouse. We do not think that people make nested decisions within the simple two outcomes of offered or not offered ESI. 5 We used a generalized estimating equation (GEE) estimator for the binary logit model to correct for the clustering of people by county. The GEE was performed within SAS (Cary, N.C.). The multinomial logit model was estimated using Stata (College Station, Tex.) and also controlled for the stratified sample design within MEPS and the clustering of people by county. 6 MEPS county identifiers are available at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) Data Center, which is where we conducted the estimations reported here. The AHRQ data center merged county data that we provided with the MEPS file; the arrangements for using the data then preclude our identifying results by county or state. 7 We also did not want to restrict our analysis to people living in MSAs since many people without ESI live in rural areas. 8 See www.bls.gov/cps/wlf- table35-2006 table35- .pdf (accessed February 23, 2007 . 9 Nationally, 15.8% of the population 18 years of age and older had not completed high school in 2004 (Census: www.census.gov/population/ socdemo/education/cps2004/tab11-01.pdf) 10 As we said in note 2, in our sample only a little more than 4% of the people who are offered ESI turn it down and remain uninsured. Although race/ethnicity is significant in predicting this outcome, without knowing more about why people are uninsured in spite of having jobs where ESI is offered, we can only speculate about why race and ethnicity might be factors.
